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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
Amici curiae listed in the Appendix to this Brief
are law professors who teach and write about statutory
interpretation and the relationship between the federal
courts and administrative agencies. Amici come together in this case because of their shared concern that
the decision below is inconsistent with fundamental
separation of powers values and risks setting a dangerous precedent with regard to agency control over judicial review of administrative action. Amici all agree
that, for the reasons set forth in this brief, the decision
below should be reversed.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The availability of judicial review derives from
both a long common law tradition and the structure of
our Constitution. Thus, under longstanding principles
of statutory interpretation and the strong presumption
in favor of judicial reviewability, courts should not construe statutes to eliminate or restrict judicial review
absent a clear statement of congressional intent to do
so. Like numerous other clear statement requirements,
this approach reflects respect for the separation of
powers by ensuring that Congress acts in a deliberate
and politically accountable manner before limiting
courts’ jurisdiction or otherwise altering the traditional

1

The parties have consented to the filing of this brief. Pursuant to Rule 37.3(a), letters consenting to the filing of this brief are
on file with the Clerk of the Court. No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person, other than
amici or their counsel, made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.
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roles and powers of the separate branches of government.
Reading the jurisdiction-stripping provision in 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) to preclude review over decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying motions to reopen is fundamentally inconsistent
with these bedrock principles. Congress provided no
clear statement that it intended to cut off judicial review of those decisions. To the contrary, Congress took
care to provide that judicial review would be foreclosed
only when Congress itself “specified” the agency’s unreviewable discretion in designated immigration statutes. By overlooking the absence of any clear statement regarding motions to reopen, the decision below
eliminated judicial review where Congress expressed
no intent to do so, and thus undermined the institutional values that clear statement requirements are intended to preserve.
That the BIA’s own implementing regulations declare its decisions on motions to reopen to be within the
agency’s discretion cannot supply the clear statement
that is missing in the statute. It is Congress’s intent
that must be clear, not the agency’s. By reading the
statute to bar judicial review where the agency’s discretion is “specified” only in its own regulations, and
not in the statute itself, the court of appeals effectively
delegated to the agency the authority—which the Constitution vests only in Congress—to decide the scope of
the federal courts’ jurisdiction. That approach undermines the same separation of powers principles that
warrant the application of a clear statement requirement in the first place. This Court should therefore reverse the court of appeals’ decision and reaffirm the
importance of the presumption of reviewability and the
need for a clear statement of congressional intent be-

3
fore assuming that Congress has precluded judicial review of agency action.
ARGUMENT
I.

COURTS SHOULD NOT CONSTRUE STATUTES TO
ELIMINATE OR RESTRICT JUDICIAL REVIEW UNLESS
CONGRESS HAS CLEARLY STATED AN INTENT TO D O
SO
A. Clear Statement Requirements Promote Important Separation Of Powers Values And
Ensure That Congress Acts Deliberately And
Openly When Redefining The Traditional
Roles Of The Branches Of Government

It is a well-established practice of statutory construction that courts do not interpret legislation to redefine the traditional roles of or balance of power
among the branches of government unless Congress
has clearly stated that it intended to do so. That approach ensures that it is Congress, not the courts, that
alters the traditional balance. Even where Congress’s
constitutional authority to act is not in doubt, such that
canons of constitutional avoidance are not implicated,
courts apply clear statement requirements out of respect for the separation of powers to ensure that Congress did not effect a significant change to the structure
of government lightly, through inadvertence, or without transparency.
Courts and commentators have recognized the important institutional values that clear statement requirements serve. For example, when important structural principles are at stake, clear statements indicate
that Congress has thought carefully about the effects of
its actions. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461
(1991) (“‘In traditionally sensitive areas, … the re-

4
quirement of clear statement assures that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue,
the critical matters involved in the judicial decision.’”
(citations omitted)); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45
Vand. L. Rev. 593, 631 (1992) (interpretive presumptions and clear statement requirements “can protect
important constitutional values against accidental or
undeliberated infringement”); Cass R. Sunstein, After
the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory
State 154 (1990) (arguing that interpretive canons encourage deliberate and accountable lawmaking).
Furthermore, requiring a clear statement of legislative intent assures that when Congress tips the balance of power, it does so in a transparent way, so that
legislators may be held accountable to voters for their
actions. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress
to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1399 (1953)
(“The primary check on Congress is the political
check—the votes of the people. If Congress wants to
frustrate the judicial check, our constitutional tradition
requires that it be made to say so unmistakably, so that
the people will understand and the political check can
operate.”); see also Herbert Wechsler, The Political
Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543, 546-547, 558-560 (1954).
Clear statement requirements also preserve the
separation of powers by ensuring that it is Congress—
not the judiciary—that makes the decision to disrupt
the status quo. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Ernest
A. Young, Tennis With the Net Down: Administrative
Federalism Without Congress, 57 Duke L.J. 2111, 2149
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(2008) (“[T]he Court’s employment of clear statement
rules in a variety of contexts reflects the traditional—
and in our view plainly correct—notion that Congress
must make the critical decisions.” (emphasis added));
Eskridge & Frickey, 45 Vand. L. Rev. at 631 (presumptions and clear statement rules “are necessary to assure that the political branches make the most important policy choices in our democracy” (emphasis
added)).
Reflecting these purposes, this Court has looked
for clear expressions of legislative intent in a wide variety of contexts to ensure that Congress has acted deliberately and transparently when disturbing traditional institutional roles. For example, the Court has
cautioned that Congress cannot alter courts’ longstanding prerogatives by “displac[ing] courts’ traditional equitable authority absent the ‘clearest command.’”
Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 340 (2000) (citation
omitted). Similarly, “[o]ut of respect for the separation
of powers and the unique constitutional position of the
President,” the Court has held that “textual silence is
not enough to subject the President to the provisions of
the [Administrative Procedure Act],” and instead required “an express statement by Congress before assuming it intended the President’s performance of his
statutory duties to be reviewed for abuse of discretion.”
Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800-801
(1992).2
The same caution has marked the Court’s approach
when the balance of power between the federal and
2

See also Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 748 & n.27 (1982)
(declining to find Congress has created a civil action for damages
against the President absent a clear statement).
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state governments is at stake. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at
460 (requiring Congress to speak clearly if it intends to
“upset the usual constitutional balance of federal and
state powers” by prescribing qualifications for state office; “‘it is incumbent upon the federal courts to be certain of Congress’ intent before finding that federal law
overrides this balance’” (citation omitted)); Atascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238-239, 242-243
(1985) (because abrogation of States’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity disrupts the “‘constitutionally
mandated balance of power,’” courts should be “certain
of Congress’ intent,” and “[t]he requirement that Congress unequivocally express this intention in the statutory language ensures such certainty” (citation omitted)); cf. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,
248 (1991) (requiring clear expression of congressional
intent before applying U.S. law extraterritorially).
These cases thus illustrate that clear statement requirements are imposed not to prevent Congress from
acting, but rather to ensure that important structural
changes do not occur through inadvertence or stealth.
See, e.g., Ex Parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 103
(1869) (declining to “giv[e] to doubtful words the effect
of withholding or abridging” the Court’s appellate habeas corpus jurisdiction).
B. A Clear Statement Is Similarly Required
When Congress Alters Courts’ Traditional
Role By Eliminating Or Restricting Judicial
Review Of Agency Action
The institutional values underlying courts’ application of clear statement requirements when other aspects of the separation of powers are at stake apply
with equal force when Congress eliminates or restricts
judicial review of agency action. There is a long historical tradition of such reviewability. Courts are thus

7
loathe to assume that Congress intended to disturb
that tradition by precluding judicial review without a
clear indication of intent to do so.
Courts’ power of judicial review of administrative
action is rooted in Anglo-American legal history, dating
back at least to the seventeenth century. See Louis L.
Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 329334 (1965). The King’s judges in England, for example,
had authority to issue the prerogative writs to inferior
officers, “order[ing] the officer to demonstrate the legality of his order or determination.” Id. at 153. Reception of this tradition into American law is illustrated
by American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902). There, the Postmaster General barred the plaintiff from conducting business
through the mail on the ground that the plaintiff’s advertisements were fraudulent. Id. at 98-99. The Postmaster General argued that his decision was “administrative” and therefore unreviewable by the court. See
id. at 108-110. The Court rejected that argument and
held that the delegation of authority to the Postmaster
General “does not necessarily and always oust the
courts of jurisdiction to grant relief to a party aggrieved.” Id. at 108. Rather, “[t]he acts of all … officers must be justified by some law, and in case an official violates the law … the courts generally have jurisdiction to grant relief.” Id. (emphasis added).
McAnnulty is the foundation in a line of cases that
solidified what has become a bedrock principle: judicial
review is presumed, unless Congress clearly says otherwise. See Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3, 8-10 (1915) (holding that immigration commissioner’s decision reflected
a misinterpretation of the law and noting that “[t]he
courts are not forbidden by the statute to consider
whether the reasons, when they are given, agree with
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the requirements of the act” (emphasis added)); Dismuke v. United States, 297 U.S. 167, 172 (1936) (interpreting the Civil Service Retirement Act and holding
that “in the absence of compelling language, resort to
the courts to assert a right which the statute creates
will be deemed to be curtailed only so far as authority
to decide is given to the administrative officer” (emphasis added)). See generally Jaffe 339 (discussing
McAnnulty).
From this common law tradition emerged a presumption of judicial review that has become a critical
element of the modern administrative state. Thus, it is
now well settled that there is a “strong presumption
that Congress intends judicial review of administrative
action.” Bowen v. Michigan Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986). By virtue of that presumption, judicial review is available unless there is
“‘clear and convincing evidence’ of a contrary legislative intent.” Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141
(1967) (quoting Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379-380
(1962)); see also Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515
U.S. 417, 424 (1995) (“[W]e have stated time and again
that judicial review of executive action will not be cut
off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that
such was the purpose of Congress.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).3
3

See also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (petitioners were entitled to judicial review where “there [was] no indication that Congress sought to
prohibit judicial review and there [was] most certainly no ‘showing
of “clear and convincing evidence” of a … legislative intent’ to restrict access to judicial review” (citations omitted)). Consistent
with the presumption, the Court has interpreted the Administrative Procedure Act’s exception to reviewability for agency action

9
This tradition of judicial review is reflected in the
constitutional structure, as well. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173-180 (1803). While the
presumption of reviewability is often invoked to avoid
due process or other concerns that might arise if individual litigants were denied any judicial review of constitutional claims, courts’ reluctance to find that Congress has eliminated or restricted judicial review absent a clear indication of intent also stems from and reinforces the constitutional separation of powers.4 The
Constitution’s text reflects the separation of powers
concerns that inhere in questions concerning the availability of judicial review in the federal courts. The
Constitution preserves judicial independence by placing the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court outside of Congress’s control, U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2,
by providing federal judges with life tenure and protection against salary diminution, id. § 1, and by limiting
Congress’s power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus,
id. art. I, § 9, cl. 2, while simultaneously giving power
otherwise to shape courts’ jurisdiction to the most politically accountable branch, see id. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; id.
art. III, §§ 1, 2.
Thus, in the face of the developing administrative
state, the presumption played an important role in preserving the institutional prerogatives of the courts and
“committed to agency discretion” to be a “very narrow exception.”
Id. (discussing 5 U.S.C. § 701) (internal quotation marks omitted).
4

The presumption of reviewability thus evolved without discussion of constitutional avoidance concepts and, indeed, long predated Justice Brandeis’s classic statement of that canon in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 345-348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see also infra p. 22.
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maintaining agencies’ legitimacy.
See Stark v.
Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 310 (1944) (“The responsibility
of determining the limits of statutory grants of authority … is a judicial function[.]”); see also Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 761 (1982) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“Even prior to the adoption of our Constitution,
as well as after, judicial review of legislative action was
recognized in some instances as necessary to maintain
the proper checks and balances.”); Stephen I. Vladeck,
Boumediene’s Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and the
Separation of Powers, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 2107,
2128 (forthcoming 2009) (courts’ concern in developing
the presumption of reviewability “was not motivated
by a perceived need to protect an individual litigant’s
right to have an Article III court provide a definitive
answer to a question … but by the possibility that the
burgeoning administrative state would frustrate the
courts’ power to have the final say”).5
The presumption of reviewability has become so
ingrained in our governmental system that Congress is
assumed to account for it in legislating. See McNary v.
Haitian Refugee Ctr. Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 496 (1991) (“It
is presumable that Congress legislates with knowledge
of our … well-settled presumption favoring interpretations of statutes that allow judicial review of administrative action[.]”); Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts,
5

See also Sunstein 143 (“This basic principle [of judicial review] assumes special importance in light of the awkward constitutional position of the administrative agency. Broad delegations of
power to regulatory agencies, questionable in light of the grant of
legislative power to Congress in Article I of the Constitution, have
been allowed largely on the assumption that courts would be available to ensure agency fidelity to whatever statutory directives
have been issued.”).
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and Constitutional Remedies, 86 Geo. L.J. 2537, 2586
(1998) (“[I]f the legislature has been told that judicial
review will not be precluded absent the clearest statement, the absence of that clear statement is inextricably part of ‘conventional’ statutory meaning.”). Thus,
when a statute is “reasonably susceptible to divergent
interpretation, [courts] adopt the reading that accords
with traditional understandings and basic principles:
that executive determinations generally are subject to
judicial review.” Gutierrez de Martinez, 515 U.S. at
434.
Accordingly, even assuming that Congress may
constitutionally foreclose judicial review of agency action in certain circumstances, to maintain the separation of powers, courts should not construe statutes to
have that effect unless it is clear that Congress has addressed the issue in an open and deliberate way. See
Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review,
78 Tex. L. Rev. 1549, 1611 (2000) (“Requiring a clear
statement of Congress’s intent to restrict federal jurisdiction effectively flags those provisions of a legislative
proposal that implicate Article III values, thereby increasing the likelihood that the political process will actually focus on the structural principles at stake.”); see
also id. at 1605-1613; Erwin Chemerinsky, A Framework for Analyzing the Constitutionality of Restrictions on Federal Court Jurisdiction in Immigration
Cases, 29 U. Mem. L. Rev. 295, 316 (1999) (“The ability
of Congress to restrict federal court jurisdiction raises
basic constitutional issues in terms of separation of
powers[.]”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative
Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101
Harv. L. Rev. 915, 939 (1988) (describing separation of
powers interests served by ensuring appellate review
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by an Article III court of decisions of non-Article III
tribunals). Applying that rule here, the Court should
not interpret the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) to foreclose judicial review of BIA decisions
unless the statute reflects Congress’s clear intent to so
provide.6
II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION CONTRAVENED
THESE CLEAR STATEMENT REQUIREMENTS A ND UNDERMINED T HE I NSTITUTIONAL V ALUES T HOSE R EQUIREMENTS A RE I NTENDED T O P RESERVE
A. There Is No Clear Statement In The Statute
That Congress Intended To Preclude Judicial
Review Of Decisions Denying Reopening
By interpreting the INA to preclude judicial review of BIA denials of motions to reopen, the Seventh
Circuit abrogated judicial review where there was no
clear statement that Congress meant to bring about
that result. The text and legislative history of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) demonstrate that Congress intended
“[d]enials of discretionary relief” by the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security to be insulated from judicial review only where Congress itself
has conferred discretion in the statute. The statute
thus provides no clear statement of intent to bar judicial review in cases where, as here, the BIA’s action is
taken pursuant to discretion conferred only by the
agency’s own regulations. By holding that the statute
nonetheless precluded judicial review, the decision below failed to give effect to the institutional values that
6

See Pet. App. 15a (Ripple, J., concurring dubitante) (“[H]ad
Congress intended to deprive [the] court of jurisdiction of specific
substantive decisions, it would have done so explicitly.”).
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underlie the clear statement requirement and instead
opened the door to the restriction or elimination of judicial review where Congress has not squarely faced
the issue. Cf. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 461.
“[T]he
starting
point”
in
interpreting
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) is its text: where “the words of the
statute are unambiguous, the judicial inquiry is complete.” Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98
(2003) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002).
Here, the plain language of the statute indicates that
Congress intended to foreclose judicial review over discretionary determinations only when the Board’s discretion is “specified” in the statute.
8 U.S.C.
7
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). To “[s]pecify” means “[t]o mention
specifically; to state in full and explicit terms; … to tell
7

The provision states:

(B) Denials of discretionary relief
Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or
nonstatutory), … and except as provided in subparagraph (D), and regardless of whether the judgment, decision, or action is made in removal proceedings, no court
shall have jurisdiction to review—
(i) any judgment regarding the granting of relief under
section 1182(h), 1182(i), 1229b, 1229c, or 1255 of this title,
or
(ii) any other decision or action of the Attorney General
or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for
which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of
Homeland Security, other than the granting of relief under section 1158(a) of this title.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2).
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or state precisely.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1399 (6th
ed. 1990). Congress did not address BIA discretion
over motions to reopen at all, much less “specif[y]” it in
the statute. Rather, the BIA’s discretion with respect
to motions to reopen is established only in its implementing regulations. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (“The decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen or reconsider
is within the discretion of the Board[.]”). The statutory
provision concerning the Board’s authority to reopen
proceedings, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7), does not refer to or
confer discretion on the Attorney General in connection
with motions to reopen, nor does the statute discuss the
agency’s role in any way. It merely imposes certain
procedural limitations on an immigrant’s ability to seek
reopening. See id. (discussing timing and content requirements for motions to reopen).8 If such broad lan8

The provision states:

(7) Motions to reopen
(A) In general
An alien may file one motion to reopen proceedings under this section, except that this limitation shall not apply so as to prevent the filing of one motion to reopen described in subparagraph (C)(iv).
(B) Contents
The motion to reopen shall state the new facts that will
be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is
granted, and shall be supported by affidavits or other
evidentiary material.
(C) Deadline
(i) In general
Except as provided in this subparagraph, the motion to
reopen shall be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of
a final administrative order of removal.
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guage were sufficient to “specif[y]” the Board’s discretion and thus bar judicial review, then “the effects of
that jurisdictional bar would be sweeping indeed.” Soltane v. DOJ, 381 F.3d 143, 147-148 (3d Cir. 2004) (Alito,
J.) (construing 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(4)). That result would
thus render the phrase “specified in this subchapter”
superfluous and would be fundamentally inconsistent
with the separation of powers principles underlying the
clear statement requirement. See, e.g., Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 295, 303 (5th Cir. 2005).
The legislative history of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) also
fails to supply the requisite clear indication of congressional intent that is missing in the statutory text. The

(ii) Asylum
There is no time limit on the filing of a motion to reopen
if the basis of the motion is to apply for relief under sections 1158 or 1231(b)(3) of this title and is based on
changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available
and would not have been discovered or presented at the
previous proceeding.
(iii) Failure to appear
The filing of a motion to reopen an order entered pursuant to subsection (b)(5) of this section is subject to the
deadline specified in subparagraph (C) of such subsection.
(iv) Special rule for battered spouses, children, and parents
Any limitation under this section on the deadlines for filing such motions shall not apply—[under specified conditions].
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c) (footnote omitted).
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legislative history provides no indication that Congress
intended to foreclose judicial review when agency discretion is conferred only by regulation. The conference
report accompanying the bill that was ultimately enacted as § 1252(a)(2)(B) contains no explanatory remarks about its meaning; it merely restates the statutory text. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-863, at 621-622
(1996).9
Nor does the provision of jurisdiction in
§ 1252(a)(2)(D) supply the necessary clear statement or
cure the problems created by the Seventh Circuit’s approach.10 That section does not govern the scope of
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). And while that provision arguably
lessens any concern that the jurisdiction-stripping
statute is unconstitutional (by allowing judicial review
of constitutional claims and questions of law that arise
9

The enacted bill incorporated language from another bill,
H.R. 2202, which was accompanied by its own separate conference
report. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-828 (1996). That report similarly
offers no indication that Congress intended to permit the BIA to
enact regulations shielding its decisions from judicial review. That
report also merely parroted the bill’s text. See id. at 219 (explaining that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) “bars judicial review … of any decision
or action by the Attorney General which is specified to be in the
discretion of the Attorney General”).
10

The provision states:

(D) Judicial review of certain legal claims
Nothing in subparagraph (B) or (C), or in any other provision of this chapter (other than this section) which limits or eliminates judicial review, shall be construed as
precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of
law raised upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2).
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in the context of discretionary agency actions), it does
not remove the need for a clear statement of what
agency actions Congress intended to cover within the
scope of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). The clear statement requirement operates to preserve the separation of powers, the traditional roles of the branches of government,
and the institutional values of accountability and deliberation. Even if Congress is not pushing the bounds of
its constitutional authority by limiting courts’ jurisdiction to review BIA decisions, separation of powers
principles still call for a clear statement that Congress
meant to exercise its authority to cut off judicial review. See, e.g., Gutierrez de Martinez, 515 U.S. at 434;
Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 242-243.
Thus, there is no clear indication that Congress intended to foreclose judicial review where the agency’s
discretion is “specified” only in the agency’s regulations. Adhering closely to the statutory requirement
that agency discretion must be “specified in the subchapter” to preclude judicial review is not only faithful
to the statute’s plain language, but also reinforces the
institutional values underlying the clear statement requirement by ensuring that Congress itself has clearly
intended to confer unreviewable discretion and has
done so in a deliberate and politically accountable fashion. In holding that the jurisdiction-stripping provision
applies even where Congress has not “specified” its intent in the statute, the Seventh Circuit violated the
clear statement requirement and its animating principles.
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B. The Seventh Circuit’s Decision Further Undermined The Separation Of Powers By
Looking To The Executive Agency To Provide The Necessary Clear Statement
As demonstrated, the court of appeals’ decision to
apply the jurisdiction-stripping provision in circumstances where Congress did not clearly intend it to apply was fundamentally inconsistent with important
separation of powers principles. Yet the Seventh Circuit did further violence to those principles by looking
instead to an administrative agency to supply the requisite clear statement—even where the agency itself
did not purport to address the availability of judicial
review in an open and deliberate fashion. See Pet. App.
4a. In doing so, the court effectively reallocated to the
Executive an authority that the Constitution confers
only on Congress.
The Constitution vests in Congress, not the Executive, the power to establish and define the jurisdiction
of the lower courts. U.S. Const. art III, § 1; see also id.
art. I, § 8 (giving Congress authority “[t]o constitute
tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court,” and to “make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers”). It is unclear whether the Constitution would permit Congress
to delegate to the Executive its authority to make rules
defining the lower courts’ jurisdiction. Even assuming
Congress could do so, however, there is no indication
here that Congress intended to take such action or provided any principle to guide the agency’s exercise of
that authority. “[W]hen Congress confers decisionmaking authority upon agencies Congress must ‘lay down
by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the
person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform.’” Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531
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U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co.
v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)). “The intelligible-principle rule seeks to enforce the understanding
that Congress may not delegate the power to make
laws and so may delegate no more than the authority to
make policies and rules that implement its statutes.”
Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771 (1996).
Just as there are outer limits on Congress’s authority to delegate its lawmaking power, so there are limits
on its authority to delegate its power to define courts’
jurisdiction. If that authority can properly be delegated to an agency, such a delegation must at least be
made by Congress itself and must be appropriately limited. Courts are thus reluctant to find such a delegation
or to sanction attempts by agencies to arrogate to
themselves the authority to determine courts’ jurisdiction—a reluctance that stems from the same institutional and separation of powers values that underlie the
use of clear statement requirements. See, e.g., Nehmer
v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 494 F.3d 846, 860861 (9th Cir. 2007) (agency cannot “remove itself from
[a] court’s authority and ignore its orders simply by enshrining its interpretation of a consent decree in a regulation”; allowing agency to do so “would raise a most
troubling question of separation of powers”); Carlyle
Towers Condo. Ass’n v. FDIC, 170 F.3d 301, 310 (2d
Cir. 1999) (“[I]t is ‘axiomatic’ that agencies can neither
grant nor curtail federal court jurisdiction.” (quoting
Miller v. FCC, 66 F.3d 1140, 1144 (11th Cir. 1995)));
United States v. Mitchell, 18 F.3d 1355, 1360 n.7 (7th
Cir. 1994) (noting that Congress’s power to define federal courts jurisdiction is “sensitive and central to our
Anglo-American legal tradition” and questioning
whether Congress may “delegate such a core legislative
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function as its control over federal court jurisdiction to
any agency or commission”).
Where such a delegation is made, it must at a
minimum be carefully circumscribed to ensure that the
ultimate jurisdictional scheme is determined by Congress, not the agency or official exercising that delegated authority. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 137
U.S. 202 (1890) (federal jurisdiction extended to guano
island upon Secretary of State’s designation of such island as “appertaining to the United States,” but only
under specified statutory conditions); United States v.
Dryden, 563 F.3d 1168, 1171 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding
there was no unconstitutional delegation to agency of
Congress’s power to define lower courts’ jurisdiction
when district court relied on Sentencing Commission
policy statement regarding jurisdiction because statement was “merely a paraphrase of Congress’s own language,” not the agency’s opinion); Owens v. Republic of
Sudan, 531 F.3d 884, 888-893 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (rejecting
non-delegation challenge to statute predicating federal
court jurisdiction on Executive Branch factfinding).11
11

Cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693-696 (1988) (delegation to judicial branch of authority to appoint Independent Counsel
did not violate separation of powers in part because the judiciary’s
appointment power was limited to requests from the Attorney
General, and although judicial branch defined scope of Independent Counsel’s jurisdiction, jurisdiction was limited to factual circumstances of Attorney General’s request); United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974) (“[T]he ‘judicial Power of the
United States’ vested in the federal courts by Art. III, § 1, of the
Constitution can no more be shared with the Executive Branch
than the Chief Executive, for example, can share with the Judiciary the veto power, or the Congress share with the Judiciary the
power to override a Presidential veto. Any other conclusion would
be contrary to the basic concept of separation of powers and the
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Here, there is no indication that Congress meant to
delegate to the BIA its authority to decide when BIA
decisions would be immune from judicial review. Yet
by looking to the Board’s regulations to determine
whether the jurisdiction-stripping provision should apply, the Seventh Circuit’s decision effectively delegated
Congress’s authority to the agency. In doing so, the
Seventh Circuit not only ignored the institutional values that require Congress to speak clearly when it intends to eliminate or restrict judicial review, but also
effectively reallocated Congress’s control over the
lower courts’ jurisdiction to the agency. Even where
Congress clearly manifests a deliberate intent to vest
the constitutional authority of one branch in another,
such a reallocation may offend the separation of powers. Cf. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726-727, 733734 (1986) (unconstitutional for Congress to reserve
sole power to remove Comptroller General because it
gave Congress control over execution of laws); INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956-959 (1983) (unconstitutional
for Congress to circumvent bicameralism and presentment requirement and presidential veto power through
statute permitting one-house congressional veto of executive action); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121-124,
129 (1976) (unconstitutional for Congress to vest in itself the power to appoint officers of the United States).
The decision below yields an even greater injury to
separation of powers concerns because it allows a selfinterested agency to increase its own power at the expense of and with no overt sanction by Congress.

checks and balances that flow from the scheme of a tripartite government.” (citing The Federalist No. 47, at 313 (James Madison)
(S. Mittell ed., 1938))).
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Permitting the BIA by regulation to trigger the
application of the jurisdiction-stripping provision is
particularly problematic because a central purpose of
the longstanding presumption of judicial reviewability
is precisely to ensure that the Executive does not act
with unchecked discretion. Thus, as long ago as
Rooke’s Case, the court held that a property owner
could bring a replevin action against the commission of
sewers to recover property taken in satisfaction of an
assessment for drainage repairs, notwithstanding the
commission’s power under its royal charter to act according “to their discretions.” 77 Eng. Rep. 209, 210
(C.P. 1597) (Coke, J.). As Sir Edward Coke famously
noted, the commission’s “proceedings ought to be limited and bound with the rule of reason and law … and
not … according to their wills and private affections.”
Id.; see also FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129
S. Ct. 1800, 1830 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(“American courts have followed a venerable legal tradition, stretching back at least to the days of Sir Edward Coke and the draining of the English fens.”). In
more recent times, this Court likewise has consistently
invoked the presumption to favor judicial review of executive agency actions. E.g., Gutierrez de Martinez,
515 U.S. at 424; Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 542
(1988); Bowen, 476 U.S. at 670; Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at
140-141.
Moreover, the presumption of review over agency
decisions is also intended in part to encourage sound
administrative decision-making and to promote agency
legitimacy. See Jaffe 323 (“From the point of view of an
agency, the question of the legitimacy of its action is so
secondary to that of the positive solution of a problem.
It is for this reason that we, in common with nearly all
of the Western countries, have concluded that the
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maintenance of legitimacy requires a judicial body independent of the active administration.”); Fallon, 101
Harv. L. Rev. at 942 (“Because of agencies’ hybrid and
problematic status in our constitutional system, Congress frequently provides for judicial review in part to
secure an imprimatur of legitimacy for administrative
action.”); see also Sunstein 154. Requiring a clear
statement of congressional intent before interpreting a
statute to foreclose judicial review of agency action
thus not only ensures that difficult decisions are made
by politically accountable bodies, but also preserves the
agency’s status as a constitutionally legitimate actor.
These salutary effects of judicial review of encouraging sound decision-making and promoting agency legitimacy are of particular importance in the context in
which this case arose. The BIA’s internal deliberative
process has been widely criticized as failing to promote
the institutional values of accountability, deliberation,
and agency legitimacy that the clear statement requirement and presumption of reviewability are intended to serve. See, e.g., Kadia v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d
817, 821 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Repeated egregious failures of
the Immigration Court and the Board to exercise care
commensurate with the stakes in an asylum case can be
understood, but not excused, as consequences of a
crushing workload[.]”); Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430
F.3d 828, 829-830 (7th Cir. 2005) (collecting statements
of “severe” judicial criticism of the BIA; “adjudication
of these cases … has fallen below the minimum standards of legal justice”).12 Looking to the agency for a
12

See also Wang v. Attorney General, 423 F.3d 260, 267-268
(3d Cir. 2005); Recinos de Leon v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 1185, 1193
(9th Cir. 2005). Indeed, some immigration judges have acknowledged that since regulatory changes in 2002 increased the BIA’s
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statement of intent to preclude judicial review where
Congress has supplied none thus violates precisely the
separation of powers principles that warrant application of a clear statement requirement in the first place.
The Seventh Circuit’s decision is even more problematic from this separation of powers perspective because even if the agency had been delegated authority
to restrict judicial review, there is in fact no indication
that it meant to exercise such authority here. The
BIA’s regulation says only that the decision to reopen
is within the Board’s discretion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).
It does not address judicial review and thus provides
neither notice that judicial review will be affected nor
any avenue for political accountability. Indeed, nothing
in the rulemaking process indicates that the BIA intended to alter the traditional balance of power between the branches of government by depriving the
federal courts of jurisdiction. See, e.g., 61 Fed. Reg.
32,924, 32,924 (June 26, 1996) (describing the purpose of
the regulation as centralizing the appeals and motions
procedures and establishing time and number limitations on motions, but omitting any mention of judicial
review).13 The Seventh Circuit’s decision below thus
presents a problem of double inadvertence by finding
judicial review to be precluded in the absence not only
reliance on affirmances without opinion, immigration judges have
not had the resources or training needed to fulfill their new responsibility to provide thorough and fully reasoned written opinions. Michele Benedetto, Crisis on the Immigration Bench, 73
Brook. L. Rev. 467, 479-480 (2008).
13

See also 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,904 (Aug. 26, 2002); 64 Fed.
Reg. 56,135, 56,142 (Oct. 18, 1999); 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,33010,331 (Mar. 6, 1997); 61 Fed. Reg. 18,900, 18,904-18,905 (Apr. 29,
1996).
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of a clear statement from Congress, but even from the
agency itself.
Nor are the harmful effects of the decision below
limited to BIA decisions on motions to reopen. The
BIA frequently acts pursuant to discretion that is conferred by its own regulations, not by statute. See, e.g.,
8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (conferring discretion in deciding
motions to reconsider); Pet. App. 14a (Ripple, J., concurring dubitante) (discussing the extension of the Seventh Circuit’s holding to motions to reconsider); see
also Pet. Br. 38-39 (discussing other examples). The
Seventh Circuit’s analysis would treat these regulations as jurisdiction-stripping actions, again without
any evidence of intent to exercise such authority by the
agency in question.
The institutional values underlying the clear
statement rule are thus directly and repeatedly implicated by the Seventh Circuit’s decision in this case.
That decision should be reversed to avoid a result that
disturbs the traditional roles of the separate branches
of government without any clear statement that Congress intended such a result. In the absence of evidence of clear intent by Congress to preclude judicial
review, it further violates separation of powers principles to look instead to an administrative agency to supply the requisite clear statement. And the agency in
any event did not do so in this case, where it never
squarely faced the question of judicial review in crafting the regulation on which the Seventh Circuit’s
analysis hinges. It is thus particularly important to reinforce the institutional values of deliberation and accountability that the clear statement requirement is
meant to promote where neither Congress nor the
agency in question has evidenced clear intent to pre-
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clude judicial review of BIA denials of motions to reopen.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision below
should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted.
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